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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 James Turner appeals his judgment of conviction 
following a jury trial.  Turner‘s  court-appointed lawyers raise 
two issues on appeal.  In addition, they have noted nine other 
issues they deem frivolous.  Further complicating matters, 
Turner has filed several documents pro se.  The apparent discord 
between Turner and his counsel invites us to explain the proper 
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role of appellate counsel who represent intransigent clients and 
to clarify the meaning of our Local Appellate Rule 31.3. 
I 
A 
 In late 2005 or early 2006, Special Agent Patrick 
Edwards of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF) began patronizing Kazoo‘s Barber Shop School of Hard 
Knocks in downtown Philadelphia.  During his periodic visits to 
Kazoo‘s, Agent Edwards noticed that his barber—whose real 
name was Victor Lawson, but who called himself ―Mikail‖—
always carried guns.  Edwards also became aware of illegal 
activities at Kazoo‘s, including the sale of stolen and counterfeit 
items.  This prompted Edwards to investigate, and he learned 
that Lawson had been convicted of felonies in Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey.  Consequently, Edwards decided to try to purchase 
firearms at Kazoo‘s. 
 Edwards made three purchases from Lawson.  On a 
fourth occasion, Lawson displayed a Kel-Tec rifle that he 
boasted could be used for ―urban combat.‖  Edwards expressed 
interest in the Kel-Tec rifle and said that he would return with 
money for the purchase.  He then prepared probable cause 
affidavits and obtained a warrant to search Lawson‘s residence 
and Kazoo‘s.  When ATF agents executed the warrants and 
arrested Lawson, they recovered the rifle.  Edwards traced the 
rifle to Lou‘s Loans, a federal firearms licensee in Upper Darby, 
Pennsylvania.  The original buyer was Lionel Coates. 
 Lawson could not have obtained the rifle legally because 
he was a felon, so Edwards asked him how he got it.  Lawson 
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responded that he bought the rifle from ―Jabriel‖ in 
Philadelphia.  Edwards showed Lawson a photo array, but 
Lawson could not identify the man who sold him the gun.  
Turner‘s photo was not part of this array. 
Edwards then interviewed Coates, the original purchaser 
of the rifle, who said that he bought the gun for ―Jabriel.‖  
According to Coates, ―Jabriel‖ really was named ―James‖ and 
lived near ―25th and Ritner Street.‖  Edwards entered this 
information into a database and retrieved Turner‘s photo.  When 
presented with an array that included Turner‘s photo, Coates and 
Lawson identified him as ―Jabriel.‖ 
 According to Coates, ―Jabriel‖ approached him to buy a 
gun.  ―Jabriel‖ drove Coates to Lou‘s Loans and pointed to the 
Kel-Tec rifle he wanted.  A week later, ―Jabriel‖ again drove 
Coates to Lou‘s and gave him money to purchase the rifle.  Both 
men entered the store, and Coates supplied his identification and 
paperwork, including a written statement that he was the ―actual 
buyer‖ of the firearm.  When the purchase was complete, the 
men left the store and placed the gun in ―Jabriel‘s‖ car.  
―Jabriel‖ paid Coates $250. 
 Based on this evidence, Turner was indicted for three 
weapons offenses.  Count One charged him with conspiring to 
make false statements to a firearms dealer, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 
371, 924(a)(1)(A), and alleged that Coates acted as Turner‘s 
―straw purchaser‖ at Lou‘s Loans.  Count Two charged Turner 
with knowingly aiding and abetting Coates in making false 
statements to a firearms dealer.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A), 
(2).  Count Three charged Turner with knowingly possessing a 
firearm after being convicted of a felony.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 
922(g)(1), 924(e). 
5 
 
B 
Lawson and Coates entered into plea agreements with the 
Government and testified against Turner at trial.  Turner‘s 
counsel attacked their credibility in his opening statement, 
suggesting that Lawson and Coates ―spill[ed] [their] guts . . . to 
get a deal.‖  Counsel also referred to the cooperating witnesses 
as ―rotten timbers to support the roof‖ of the Government‘s case 
and called Lawson a ―bad apple‖ and a ―rat.‖  He concluded his 
opening statement by asserting that the Government had nothing 
but ―the testimony of two liars.‖ 
During cross-examination, Turner‘s counsel accused 
Agent Edwards of helping to ―orchestrate‖ the Government‘s 
case and insinuated that Edwards impermissibly helped Lawson 
identify Turner.  Counsel also implied that Lawson had lied to 
curry favor with the Government, asking Edwards: ―when 
Victor Lawson started to spill the beans, you took notes with 
respect to all of the individuals that he targeted, correct?,‖ and 
―as far as you know how this process works, when he ultimately 
gets sentenced, who knows how many years from now, the 
judge who‘s going to be sentencing him is going to hear how he 
testified [in other cases] whether the testimony was truthful or 
not[?].‖ 
On redirect examination, Edwards testified that Lawson 
had cooperated with the Government in other cases against 
twelve or thirteen people.  According to Edwards, Lawson 
provided information regarding home invasions, robberies, 
straw purchasers, narcotics traffickers, and counterfeiting.  
When the Government asked Edwards, ―[w]hat happened with 
the other cases?,‖ Turner objected.  The District Court overruled 
the objection, and Edwards answered, ―[a]ll of the defendants 
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that have been charged to date have either pled guilty or gone to 
trial and were found guilty.‖  Turner renewed his objection, but 
the District Court denied it because Edwards‘s statement was 
―an objective fact.‖ 
 The jury also heard Lawson testify that he initially did 
not tell Edwards that ―Jabriel‖ was Turner because Lawson had 
been calling Turner ―Jabriel‖ for so long that he had forgotten 
Turner‘s real name.  On cross-examination, Turner‘s counsel 
accused Lawson of ―forget[ting] things that are convenient‖ and 
―diming out‖ people to fulfill a ―contract‖ with the Government. 
During redirect examination, the Government argued that 
Turner had ―opened the door‖ about how well Lawson knew 
Turner and sought permission ―to ask [Lawson] how he kn[ew] 
what [Turner‘s] real name was as opposed to his Muslim name.‖ 
 The Court allowed the Government to do so but instructed the 
Government to use ―pointed questions‖ and to avoid using the 
word ―Muslim.‖  When questioning resumed, Lawson stated that 
he met Turner through a religious organization in the 1980‘s, 
when he knew him both by his ―birth name‖ and as ―Jimmy X 
Turner.‖  Lawson used this name in a ―dossier,‖ which was a 
―profile on each member of the [religious] organization[,] their 
name, their home address, their educational background, their 
criminal records, and so on and so forth.‖  Finally, Lawson 
testified that by the time Edwards interviewed him, he had 
forgotten Turner‘s real name and only referred to him by the 
―name that‘s given to [him] in the organization‖ because 
―[n]obody uses their Christian name on the streets.‖  Lawson 
confirmed that his own ―religious name‖ was ―Mikail.‖ 
The jury found Turner guilty on all three counts.  He was 
subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months‘ 
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imprisonment pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e), and his advisory imprisonment range under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines was 210 to 262 months.  
The District Court varied downward, imposing a sentence of 
190 months‘ imprisonment.  Turner filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  The District Court then granted trial counsel leave to 
withdraw and appointed new counsel for Turner.
1
 
C 
Once on appeal, this case took several unusual turns.  
First, Turner‘s counsel filed what might be called a ―quasi-
Anders brief,‖ which raised a combination of colorable and 
frivolous arguments.  As for the colorable arguments, Turner‘s 
counsel challenged the District Court‘s failure to give a jury 
instruction regarding testimony about the guilty pleas and 
verdicts resulting from Lawson‘s cooperation with the 
Government.  Counsel also challenged the District Court‘s 
failure to strike Lawson‘s references to ―Jimmy X Turner‖ and 
the ―criminal record[s]‖ in his ―dossier.‖  In addition to these 
two arguments, Turner‘s counsel raised nine issues ―in the style 
of an Anders brief,‖ explaining why they considered those issues 
frivolous. 
Taking his cue from counsel‘s brief, Turner filed a pro se 
document requesting that his counsel withdraw and advancing 
entirely new arguments on the merits.  Because Turner styled 
this document as a ―supplement to be attached to the brief filed 
[by counsel],‖ we construed it as a motion for leave to file a 
                                                 
1 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Our jurisdiction lies under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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supplemental brief.  Two weeks later, Turner‘s counsel filed a 
separate ―Motion for Leave for the Appellant to File a Pro Se 
Supplemental Brief.‖  In doing so, counsel acknowledged that 
Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 31.3 prohibits represented 
parties from filing pro se briefs, but they noted that the Rule also 
allows counsel ―in the unusual case [to] file a motion to file a 
supplemental brief, if appropriate.‖  3d Cir. L.A.R. 31.3.  
Counsel conceded that this case was not governed by Anders 
because they had not sought to withdraw from their 
representation of Turner.  Nevertheless, counsel urged the Court 
to accept a supplemental brief from Turner because their ―quasi-
Anders‖ brief rendered this an ―unusual case‖ under Local 
Appellate Rule 31.3. 
A motions panel of this Court entered an order referring 
both Turner‘s and his counsel‘s motions to the merits panel.  
The Government filed a motion for reconsideration of that order, 
arguing that it contravened Local Appellate Rule 31.3 because it 
required the Government to respond to the litany of issues raised 
in both counsel‘s ―quasi-Anders brief‖ and Turner‘s pro se 
motion.  According to the Government, Turner was improperly 
seeking ―hybrid representation‖ and ―should [have been] 
compelled to determine . . . whether he [was] represented by 
counsel or wishe[d] to proceed pro se.‖ 
Because we had not yet ruled on whether Turner could 
file a supplemental brief pro se, Turner and his counsel 
responded to the Government‘s motion independently.  First, 
Turner filed a motion purporting to ―counterattack‖ the 
Government‘s motion, as well as requesting ―hybrid 
representation by both counsel and defendant‖ because there 
were ―issues of merit that [they stood] divided on.‖  Next, 
counsel filed their own response to the Government‘s motion, 
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reiterating that this qualified as an ―unusual case‖ under Local 
Appellate Rule 31.3.  Counsel added that they had filed a 
―quasi-Anders‖ brief ―to satisfy [their] dual obligations to the 
defendant and to this Court . . . to make any arguments they 
could in good faith on the defendant‘s behalf [while addressing] 
arguments that the client insisted be made, despite [their] 
advice.‖ 
The motions panel denied the Government‘s motion for 
reconsideration.  Consequently, the Government filed a merits 
brief that addressed the two non-frivolous issues in counsel‘s 
―quasi-Anders‖ brief but insisted that pro se briefs by counseled 
parties violate our local rules.  Turner‘s counsel filed a reply 
brief, contending that Local Appellate Rule 31.3 was ambiguous 
and could be read to permit counsel ―in the unusual case [to] file 
a motion to file a supplemental brief [authored by the pro se 
defendant].‖  The case was calendared, and oral argument was 
scheduled. 
The case took yet another twist, however, when we 
granted Turner‘s and counsel‘s long-pending initial motions, 
which had requested leave for Turner to file a pro se 
supplemental brief.  Turner seized on this opportunity to file yet 
another brief, which he conceded did not ―quote[] any case law, 
states [sic], or rules‖ but which nevertheless raised four 
additional issues.  Justifiably perplexed, the Government 
responded to Turner‘s third and final pro se filing, beginning 
with the understatement that ―[t]his appeal has followed a most 
unusual course.‖  The Government also expressed confusion 
because it believed that Turner already had submitted a 
supplemental pro se brief as part of his first motion to this 
Court.  The Government therefore was ―unclear whether the 
opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief [in the Court‘s 
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latest order] referred to a new brief, or a reply brief to the 
government‘s brief.‖  Finally, the Government once again 
argued that the Court should not consider Turner‘s pro se 
arguments while he was represented by counsel, but ―for the 
benefit of the Court‖ the Government responded to ―the latest 
four in the apparently endless[] series of pro se issues presented 
by Turner.‖ 
II 
Turner concedes that we review the two colorable issues 
raised by his appellate counsel for plain error because they were 
not raised at trial.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  ―To find plain 
error, we must conclude that (1) there was error; (2) the error 
was clear or obvious; (3) the error affected the defendant‘s 
substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the legal proceeding.‖ 
 United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 211 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 
United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2010)).  ―If the 
defendant satisfies this showing, we may, but are not required 
to, order correction.‖  Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 735–36 (1993)). 
III 
 Having described the convoluted procedural history of 
this case and the applicable standard of review, we turn to the 
merits of the non-frivolous issues raised by counsel in Turner‘s 
opening brief.  Through counsel, Turner argues that the District 
Court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding 
Lawson‘s cooperation with the Government.  Turner concedes, 
however, that he has ―not found any case law supporting [his] 
position‖ and that his argument ―is not based on any direct 
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precedent.‖  The absence of controlling precedent forecloses 
Turner‘s plain error argument on this issue.  And while he 
contends that United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Services 
(PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), is 
―analogous‖ to his case, he also candidly admits that there are 
―important differences between the two types of situations.‖  We 
agree that Universal Rehabilitation Services is distinguishable 
and therefore find no ―clear or obvious‖ error in the District 
Court‘s failure to give a limiting instruction. 
 Turner also argues that the District Court plainly erred by 
allowing the Government to elicit testimony regarding ―Jimmy 
X Turner‖ and Lawson‘s ―dossier,‖ which purportedly contained 
Turner‘s ―criminal records.‖  Turner claims the reference to 
―Jimmy X Turner‖ had no probative value but ―might be 
understood by at least some jurors as a reference to a Muslim 
associated with followers of the late ‗Malcom X,‘ who some 
might think of as an anti-establishment radical.‖  He also 
contends that Lawson‘s ―dossier‖ reference suggested Turner 
was in ―a religious organization where it was standard to have a 
criminal record.‖ 
We find no error, let alone plain error, in the District 
Court‘s admission of this evidence.  Federal Rule of Evidence 
403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence ―if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . unfair 
prejudice.‖  The risk of prejudice from this evidence was slight. 
 The mere addition of ―X‖ to Turner‘s name was unlikely to 
stoke the jury‘s passions.  And although Lawson testified that he 
kept ―dossiers‖ with information on ―each member of the 
organization[,] their name, their home address, their educational 
background, their criminal records, and so on,‖ he did not testify 
that Turner had a criminal record.  Therefore, we reject Turner‘s 
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second argument. 
IV 
 In addition to the colorable issues we have discussed, 
Turner‘s counsel have proffered nine arguments ―in the style of 
an Anders brief,‖ presenting issues that ―the defendant directed 
counsel to raise‖ but explaining why they are frivolous.2  
Despite counsel‘s creative attempt to satisfy their client, Turner 
himself has filed two documents that raise a host of separate 
issues.  As a result of this rift in the attorney-client relationship, 
Turner urges us to grant ―hybrid representation . . . because there 
are issues . . . which [they] stand divided on.‖  As we shall 
explain, this is not the proper procedure to follow when counsel 
and their clients disagree on which arguments to present to this 
Court. 
A 
We turn now to counsel‘s ―quasi-Anders‖ brief.  
Although we have no doubt that it was well-intentioned and 
counsel were no doubt perplexed as to what to do, the brief was 
improper. 
As an initial matter, Turner‘s counsel rightly note that 
they had no constitutional obligation to present frivolous issues 
in their brief.  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) 
(―Neither Anders nor any other decision of this Court suggests 
. . . that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to 
compel appointed counsel to press [even] nonfrivolous points 
                                                 
 
2
  Because we agree with counsel that these issues are 
frivolous, we do not address them here. 
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requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional 
judgment, decides not to present those points.‖ (emphasis 
added)).  Nevertheless, counsel contend that ―the ethical rules 
applicable here, while they do not create an obligation to present 
any or all arguments which the defendant insists be raised, did 
provide a backdrop against which counsel made their strategic 
decisions.‖  Counsel cite the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which require a lawyer to ―reasonably consult with the 
client about the means by which the client‘s objectives are to be 
accomplished.‖  Pa. R. Prof‘l Conduct 1.4. 
But the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct do 
―not prescribe how . . . disagreements are to be resolved.‖  Id. at 
1.2 cmt. 2.  Indeed, other portions of the Rules suggest that 
counsel‘s approach was unwarranted.  For example, they 
provide ―the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging 
the lawyer.‖3  Id.  The Rules do not require anything like a 
―quasi-Anders brief.‖  Id.  To the contrary, they state that a 
―lawyer is not bound . . . to press for every advantage that might 
be realized for a client.  For example, a lawyer may have 
authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the 
means by which a matter should be pursued.‖  Id. at 1.3 cmt. 1.  
Moreover, the lawyer ―shall not . . . assert or controvert an issue 
. . . unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous.‖  Id. at 3.1.  This basic rule accords with the Supreme 
Court‘s admonition that ―[a]n attorney, whether appointed or 
paid, is . . . under an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a 
frivolous appeal.‖  McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 
                                                 
3 
 We caution that a motion to discharge appellate 
counsel after counsel has filed a brief is likely to be denied.  
See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 163 
(2000) (no right to self-representation on appeal). 
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486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988).  Stated simply, counsel need not, and 
should not, present frivolous arguments merely because a client 
instructs them to do so.
4
 
Here, counsel‘s ―quasi-Anders‖ brief runs afoul of the 
guidance provided by the Supreme Court in McCoy: 
It is essential to keep in mind that the so-called 
―Anders brief‖ is not expected to serve as a 
substitute for an advocate‘s brief on the merits, 
for it would be a strange advocate‘s brief that 
would contain a preface advising the court that 
the author of the brief is convinced that his or her 
arguments are frivolous and wholly without merit. 
 Rather, the function of the brief is to enable the 
court to decide whether the appeal is so frivolous 
that the defendant has no federal right to have 
counsel present his or her case to the court. 
Id. at 439 n.13.  Anders briefs ensure that constitutional rights 
are protected; they are not an opportunity to brief issues that 
would otherwise be unacceptable.  Id. at 444.  By filing an 
Anders brief without seeking to withdraw, counsel have 
presented issues to the Court that need not have been raised.  Id. 
at 436. 
Attorneys ―need not, and should not, raise every . . . 
claim but rather may select among them in order to maximize 
                                                 
4 
 It is important to remember that the Supreme Court 
has held that an indigent appellant has no right to counsel of 
choice.  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 
(2006). 
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the likelihood of success on appeal.‖  Showers v. Beard, 635 
F.3d 625, 634 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 
259, 288 (2000)). 
Experienced advocates since time beyond 
memory have emphasized the importance of 
winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and 
focusing on one central issue if possible, or at 
most on a few key issues. . . . A brief that raises 
every colorable issue runs the risk of burying 
good arguments—those that . . . ―go for the 
jugular‖—in a verbal mound made up of strong 
and weak contentions. 
Jones, 463 U.S. at 751–53.  ―Indeed, an appellate lawyer‘s 
exercise of professional judgment in omitting weaker claims is 
obviously of benefit to the client: the more claims an appellate 
brief contains, the more difficult for an appellate judge to avoid 
suspecting that there is no merit to any of them.‖  Johnson v. 
Tennis, 549 F.3d 296, 302 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Ruggero J. Aldisert, The 
Appellate Bar: Professional Competence and Professional 
Responsibility—A View from the Jaundiced Eye of One 
Appellate Judge, 11 Cap. U. L. Rev. 445, 458 (1982) 
(―Appellate advocacy is measured by effectiveness, not 
loquaciousness.‖).  ―[T]o second-guess reasonable professional 
judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise 
every ‗colorable‘ claim suggested by a client would disserve the 
very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy that underlies 
Anders.‖  Jones, 463 U.S. at 754. 
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B 
 In addition to vetting frivolous issues in their ―quasi-
Anders brief,‖ counsel invite us to consider Turner‘s pro se 
filings, which also present frivolous issues, because this is an 
―unusual case.‖  We reject that invitation because our local rules 
preclude us from considering Turner‘s pro se arguments while 
he is represented by counsel.  Accordingly, the order filed 
December 1, 2011 is hereby vacated. 
Pro se litigants have no right to ―hybrid representation‖ 
because ―[a] defendant does not have a constitutional right to 
choreograph special appearances by counsel.‖  McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984).  ―Once a pro se defendant 
invites or agrees to any substantial participation by counsel, 
subsequent appearances by counsel must be presumed to be with 
the defendant‘s acquiescence, at least until the defendant 
expressly and unambiguously . . . request[s] that . . . counsel be 
silenced.‖  Id. 
Even absent our longstanding prohibition on ―hybrid 
representation,‖ we still could not consider Turner‘s pro se 
filings because we are bound by our local rules, which state: 
Except in cases in which counsel has filed a 
motion under L.A.R. 109.2 to withdraw under 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), parties 
represented by counsel may not file a brief pro se. 
 If a party sends a pro se brief to the court, the 
clerk will forward the brief to the party‘s attorney 
of record, with notice to the pro se party.  Counsel 
may choose to include the arguments in his or her 
brief or may in the unusual case file a motion to 
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file a supplemental brief, if appropriate. 
3d Cir. L.A.R. 31.3.  Consistent with this rule, we have stated 
repeatedly in not precedential opinions that we consider pro se 
briefs only in situations governed by Anders.  See, e.g., United 
States v. McCoy, 272 F. App‘x 212, 215 (3d Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Reyes, 271 F. App‘x 217, 218 (3d Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Awala, 260 F. App‘x 469, 471–72 (3d Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Lott, 240 F. App‘x 992, 995 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Although in the past we considered counseled parties‘ pro se 
filings in ―unusual circumstances,‖ see United States v. Salemo, 
61 F.3d 214, 218 n.2 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Essig, 10 
F.3d 968, 969 (3d Cir. 1994), Local Appellate Rule 31.3 should 
have abrogated that practice when it became effective in 2002. 
 Counsel for Turner argue that Local Appellate Rule 31.3 
is ambiguous.  In their view, ―[c]ounsel may choose to include 
the arguments [of the pro se defendant] in his or her brief or may 
in the unusual case file a motion to file a supplemental brief 
[authored by the pro se defendant], if appropriate.‖  Counsel 
correctly imply that Rule 31.3 does not specify who, in the 
―unusual case,‖ may be permitted to file a supplemental brief.  
The rule can be read, as counsel suggests, to permit the filing of 
pro se briefs by counseled defendants in ―unusual‖ and 
―appropriate‖ cases.  But the rule also can be read, as the 
Government suggests, to require all supplemental briefs to be 
filed by counsel. 
We find the Government‘s interpretation to be the more 
natural reading of Rule 31.3.  The Rule states that ―[c]ounsel . . 
. may . . . file a motion to file a supplemental brief.‖  3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 31.3 (emphasis added).  There is no mention of 
represented parties in this sentence.  The beginning of Rule 
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31.3, which does mention pro se filings, states that they will be 
forwarded to counsel rather than submitted to the Court.  Id.  
Moreover, allowing represented parties to file pro se 
supplemental briefs would contradict the first sentence of Rule 
31.3, which states: ―[e]xcept in [Anders cases], parties 
represented by counsel may not file a brief pro se.‖  Id. 
By requiring that briefs be filed only by counsel, we 
ensure that counsel and client speak with one voice.  When a 
client seeks to raise additional issues, counsel must evaluate 
them and present only the meritorious ones, rather than simply 
seeking leave for the client to file a supplemental brief.  This 
promotes effective advocacy because it prevents counsel from 
allowing frivolous arguments to be made by the client.  See 
Jones, 463 U.S. at 751–53. 
We also note that the convoluted procedural history in 
this case illustrates well the hazards of reading Rule 31.3 as 
Turner‘s counsel suggest.  If represented parties could file pro se 
briefs, their adversaries would have to respond on two distinct 
fronts.  Apart from the procedural morass that would follow 
such ―hybrid‖ advocacy (as occurred in this case), our attention 
would be diverted from potentially meritorious arguments. 
In light of the foregoing, we now hold that, except in 
cases governed by Anders, parties represented by counsel may 
not file pro se briefs.  When such briefs are filed nonetheless, 
the Clerk will refer them to the putative pro se litigant‘s counsel. 
 At that point, counsel may (1) include the client‘s pro se 
arguments in their own briefs or (2) in the appropriate and 
unusual case, seek leave to file a separate, supplemental brief 
drafted by counsel that advances arguments raised by the client. 
 Of course, such briefs should make only those arguments 
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counsel believe, consistent with their ethical duty, to be 
meritorious. 
V 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm Turner‘s 
conviction. 
